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Abstract— A nearest neighbor-based detection scheme
against load redistribution attacks is presented. The de-
tector is designed to scale from small to very large sys-
tems while guaranteeing consistent detection performance.
Extensive testing is performed on a realistic, large scale
system to evaluate the performance of the proposed detec-
tor against a wide range of attacks, from simple random
noise attacks to sophisticated load redistribution attacks.
The detection capability is analyzed against different attack
parameters to evaluate its sensitivity. Finally, a statistical
test that leverages the proposed detection algorithm is
introduced to identify which loads are likely to have been
maliciously modified, thus, localizing the attack subgraph.
This test is based on ascribing to each load a risk measure
(probability of being attacked) and then computing the best
posterior likelihood that minimizes log-loss.
Index Terms— machine learning, nearest neighbor, false
data injection (FDI) attack, load redistribution attack, cyber-
security, attack detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE electrical grid is a constantly evolving cyber-physicalsystem and, as such, it is increasingly reliant on infor-
mation and communication technology. A vast research effort
undertaken in the past decade in the field of cybersecurity of
power systems has identified some crucial vulnerabilities of
the cyber layer which can be exploited to disrupt the physical
system. In this context, [1] shows that state estimation (SE)
and the traditional bad data detector (BDD) used in energy
management systems (EMSs) can be easily spoofed and by-
passed via false data injection (FDI) attacks. This finding
represents the basis for the design of a wide class of attacks
called load redistribution (LR) attacks. Load redistribution
attacks can be performed by injecting intelligently designed
false measurements that lead to a wrong estimate of the system
state. From the operator’s perspective the attack makes it
appear as if the system loads have changed from their actual
values, without changing the net load.
In [2] and [3], the concept of load redistribution attacks is
formalized by developing a bi-level attacker-defender problem
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for targeted attacks. In this setting, the attacker can design
false measurements which can cause physical consequences
on the system; specifically, [3] attempts to find an attack,
unobservable to the EMS, to cause a power overload on a
target line. In a similar fashion, [4], [5] present examples of
LR attacks on the electricity market: the authors show that it is
possible to launch load redistribution attacks that create system
congestion, thus manipulating locational marginal prices.
We propose a new bad data detector that can identify LR
attacks based on the analysis of load estimates, thus overcom-
ing the limitations of SE and the traditional BDD. In [6], we
developed three anomaly detectors, each based on a different
machine learning technique: replicator neural network, support
vector machine, and nearest neighbor. These detectors can
effectively determine if the observed loads represent a norma-
tive system state or if they have been maliciously modified.
The nearest neighbor-based detector works by finding in the
historical data the closest load vector to the real time loads
and, based on the measured Euclidean distance, a thresholding
technique is used to decide if the loads are normative or
anomalous. From our tests, nearest neighbor demonstrated the
best performance out of the three proposed. In this paper, we
build on this preliminary work to design an improved detector
and an attack localization scheme. The novel contributions of
this paper are as follows:
• The basic detector is modified so that it scales to much
larger power system models while preserving the good
detection performance shown in [6]. This is achieved by
devising a grouping strategy to organize the system loads
into clusters that can be analyzed independently.
• Extensive testing and sensitivity analysis is performed to
evaluate the performance of the detector against intelli-
gently designed LR attacks as well as random anomalous
load changes. This allows for the characterization of the
strengths and limitations of the detector. Furthermore,
the proposed algorithm is integrated within a complete
EMS platform to showcase its detection performance and
computational efficiency.
• Building on the improved detector, a statistical approach
is presented to localize the attacks and determine the
likelihood of each load of being attacked. The deviation
in loads is captured via a Z-score and log-loss is used as
a measure to find the likelihood function that minimizes
the error. This represents a crucial step towards the
development of decision tools that can help operators to
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2securely manage power systems when targeted by cyber-
attacks.
Related work on the design of FDI and LR attack detectors
can be found in the literature. For example, in [7], multiple
linear regression is used to study the voltage profiles in a
system and determine if a LR attack is taking place. Unlike our
work, the method there proposed is designed for distribution
systems and, as we will explain later, the attacks tested are
not realistic as they simulate changes in loads of up to 100%.
Other work focuses on using deep neural networks to learn
the temporal correlation which exists between the real-time
measurements and previous samples [8], or verifying the
statistical behavior of the estimated states over time [9]. The
assumption on which these detectors are built is that when an
attack is injected, the false measurements are not compatible
with the dynamics observed from the previous measurements
thus making it possible to flag them as attacked. Based
on this, a slow ramping attack which only slightly changes
the system’s state at each sampling time will likely not be
detected. Moreover, these detectors are tested on limited attack
scenarios and their performance is not verified against multiple
classes of attacks. Finally, while many attack detectors have
been proposed, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the idea
of detecting FDI attacks by identifying patterns in the observed
loads has not been explored before.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II
a description of load redistribution attacks and how to design
them is presented. In Section III we summarize the basic
detection algorithm we have presented in [6] and show its
performance limitations when used on large scale systems. The
required improvements are described in Section IV and the
detection results on a wide range of load redistribution attacks
are presented in Section V. Section VI illustrates the statistical
analysis that leverages the improved nearest neighbor-based
detector to determine the buses that have been attacked.
II. ATTACK MODEL AND DESIGN
For a power system, the relationship between the vector of
measurements z and the state vector x can be written as
z = h(x) + e (1)
where h is the non-linear relationship between measurements
and states (usually, complex bus voltages), while vector e
represents the random measurement noise. As shown in [1],
an unobservable attack can be constructed by replacing the
original measurements z with a corrupted set of measurements
z¯ such that
z¯ = h(x+ c) (2)
where c is the state attack vector. Based on this fundamen-
tal result, the authors in [3] present a bi-level optimization
problem to compute an attack vector c that will maximize the
power flow on a specific target line. To cause such physical
consequences on the system, the false measurements must be
designed in such a way that they will initiate a system response
in the form of generation redispatch. This can be done by
creating an unobservable attack that will lead state estimation
to wrongly estimate the system loads, thus causing a wrong
dispatch solution. The bi-level optimization problem proposed
in [3] is improved in [10] to make it more efficient and scalable
to large scale systems. The first level models the attacker’s
choice of attack to maximize the overload on a target line; the
second level models the system’s response to the attack via
a DCOPF to observe the resulting physical consequences. In
designing the false measurements, the attacker is limited on
how much the false loads can deviate from the real loads: the
load shift factor represents the maximum percentage by which
any load can be modified. This constraint comes from the fact
that an operator would easily identify a large change in load
over a short period of time as an anomaly; in the existing
literature, a load shift of 20% is considered the maximum
allowable for an attack to remain unobservable. The attack
detector presented in this paper aims at identifying in real
time if the set of measured loads is genuine or if it is the
result of an attack on state estimation. As we will show, the
proposed detector is able to easily identify attacks with load
shifts of 15% and lower.
III. BASIC DETECTION ALGORITHM
A. Small systems
The proposed attack detection mechanism works by analyz-
ing the correlation structure within the currently observed load
values and comparing it to attack-free historical load data. The
measured load configuration to be tested is given as input to
the detector which generates a scalar value. This value is then
compared against a threshold τ to label the loads as normative
or attacked. To evaluate the detection performance, two met-
rics are used: detection probability, which is the ratio between
the number of cases correctly labelled as attacked and the total
number of attacked cases tested, and false alarm rate, which
is the number of normative cases that are labelled as attacked
divided by the total number of normative cases tested. The
specific value of the threshold is chosen as a tradeoff between
detection probability and false alarm rate. Our approach can
be considered a semi-supervised learning problem since the
detectors are trained only on normative data which is already
widely available to operators. Because no attacked data is
needed in the training phase, the detectors will not be biased
towards specific types of attacks. Given the almost identical
detection capability of the three detectors tested in [6], in the
following work, the nearest neighbor detector is chosen for its
computational and explanatory simplicity.
Nearest neighbor algorithms are based on the assumption
that data labelled as normative lies in limited, dense regions
of space while anomalies are located further from these
neighborhoods [11], [12]. Let us define p ∈ Rn as the vector
of observed load values to be tested, where n is the number
of loads in the system. The normative data is represented by
the set P histN ∈ Rn×nh of historical load vectors hi ∈ Rn that
have been observed in the past, where nh is the total number
of historical vectors. The classification is done by measuring
the Euclidean distance between the current load profile p and
every vector hi in the historical dataset (assumed to be attack-
free). The closest distance d for sample p is defined as
d = min
j=[1:nh]
‖p− hj‖2 . (3)
3To label p as normative or attacked, d is compared against a
predetermined threshold τ .
In [6], we tested this approach on the IEEE 30 bus system.
Publicly available zonal historical load data from the PJM
system [13] was mapped to the loads of the 30 bus system
to create hourly load profiles for 5 consecutive years. The
proposed detector showed very high detection capability with
low false alarm rates. Figure 1 is taken from [6] and it shows
some of the results obtained on this small system. The blue
points represent the minimum distance for the normative load
vectors (not attacked) while in green and red are the distances
corresponding to attacked cases with 10% and 15% load shift,
respectively. This illustrates how loads resulting from attacks
lead to much higher nearest neighbor distances compared to
normative load profiles; thus, suggesting that the minimum
distance is an effective metric for attack detection.
B. Large systems
While the results obtained on the 30 bus system are promis-
ing, the detector needs to be tested on large scale systems
to verify its performance in a more realistic setting and to
guarantee its suitability for implementation in real system
operations. To this end, the same analysis presented in [6]
and summarized in the previous section is performed on the
synthetic Texas system [14], [15]. This model, developed at
Texas A&M, is a synthetic grid of the state of Texas. It has
2000 buses, 3206 branches, and 1125 loads and it includes
bus-level hourly load data for the year 2016. Using the attack
model described in Section II, around 280 attacks with load
shift of 15% have been designed on the most congested
cases. We randomly selected 90% of the 8784 normative load
vectors to represent the historical data, and the remaining
10% for testing. The nearest neighbor algorithm is used to
compute the minimum distance for the test and the attacked
load vectors against the historical load data. Figure 2 shows
the minimum distance for each normative load vector (blue
points) and for the attacked cases (red points). It is easy
to see that the detector does not perform well, and that the
attacked cases are indistinguishable from the normative ones.
This can be explained by the fact that when measuring the
Euclidean distance between two high-dimensional vectors, the
contribution of a limited subset of dimensions is small. That
is, if only a few tens of loads are attacked, the total distance
measured over hundreds of loads will deviate only slightly
from the distance computed on the load vector where no loads
are modified. In this case, each load vector has dimension 1125
and the attacks modify only about 100 to 200 loads; the effect
of the attacked loads is not large enough to result in distance
values significantly higher than those of the normative data.
IV. DETECTION ON LARGE SCALE SYSTEMS
The simple test presented in the previous section shows
that the basic nearest neighbor detector introduced in [6] does
not perform as well when applied to large scale systems
(hundreds or thousands of buses). For this reason we need
a new approach to improve the detection mechanism to be
effective for any system, regardless of its size. The method we
Fig. 1. IEEE 30 bus system: distribution of nearest neighbor distance
for normative and attacked cases.
Fig. 2. Synthetic Texas system: distribution of nearest neighbor
distance for normative and attacked cases.
propose aims to leverage the capability of the nearest neighbor
algorithm to identify anomalous loads even when only a small
fraction of the total system loads are being attacked.
Previous work has shown that in a large transmission-level
system, load redistribution attacks tend to target only some
portions of the network. As a consequence, the loads which
are modified represent a subset of the total system loads and
they are restricted to a subgraph of limited size. Based on
these observations, the detection algorithm is modified so that
it analyzes multiple predefined subsets of the system loads.
In this work we propose a grouping strategy that can be used
to divide the loads into relatively small groups such that they
can be analyzed independently and in parallel by the attack
detector. It is important to notice that the strategy presented
in the next section is just one example of grouping which
empirically worked well for the systems tested. Different
grouping techniques, perhaps leveraging specific knowledge
and insights regarding the power system to be secured, can
be easily implemented within the framework of the proposed
detection algorithm.
4A. Grouping strategy
The first step required to define the load groups is to sort
the loads based on their MW rating, from largest to smallest.
Starting from the largest load, the first group is created by
including the load itself and all its neighboring loads within a
certain radius rg , where the radius is measured as the smallest
number of branches connecting two loads. At this point, the
next largest load is selected and if it is not contained in any of
the previous groups, a new group is created. This process is
repeated until ng groups are defined. Note that it is possible for
a bus to be contained in multiple groups, or no groups. The
parameters rg and ng have a direct effect on the detection
performance and their selection will be discussed in the next
sections. As our results show, this grouping strategy proves
to be very effective in the detection of LR attacks because it
ensures that the largest loads in a system are monitored. Prior
work on FDI attacks on SE shows that, to cause significant
consequences, an attacker is required to target large loads in
order to create large power flow changes [2]–[5].
B. Detection algorithm
Dividing the n system loads into groups allows us to
overcome the dimensionality issue observed in Section III-
B. The basic nearest neighbor detector can be used on large
systems by running the algorithm individually on each load
group. In this case, a threshold τj must be defined for each
individual group gj , for j ∈ [1 : ng]. The vector p ∈ Rn
containing the estimated loads computed by SE is divided
into ng groups according to the procedure described in the
previous subsection. Let us define pj as the vector containing
the real-time values of the loads in group gj . For each group,
the minimum distance between the load vector pj and the
corresponding loads in the historical dataset is calculated as
dj = min
r=[1:nh]
‖pj − hjr‖2 (4)
where hjr is the subset of loads belonging to group gj from
the rth historical load vector. The minimum distance is then
compared to the threshold τj to determine if the loads in group
gj are normative or anomalous. Specifically, if dj > τj , an
alarm is raised, while if dj < τj the loads are considered
attack-free. This process is repeated for every group and if
one or more alarms are raised, the load vector p is labelled as
anomalous.
V. TESTING THE IMPROVED DETECTOR
A. Experimental procedure
The performance of the nearest neighbor-based detector in
conjunction with the grouping strategy is tested in depth in
the following sections. The detection capability is measured
both on intelligently designed attacks as well as random load
redistribution attacks; moreover, we study its sensitivity to
different parameters, such as the load shift of the attack and
the number of attacked buses.
The goal of the following experiments is to analyze the
quality of the detector at understanding if a load vector
is normative or attacked. The primary test system used is
the synthetic Texas system described in Section III-B; all
numerical results discussed below are based on this system.
Additional testing performed on the 2383 bus Polish test case
[16], for which we generated historical load profiles based
on real data from a major US ISO [17], showed comparable
results and it is here omitted due to space constraints.
First, the 1125 system loads in the Texas system are divided
into groups following the procedure from Section IV-A. For
the tests described below, the parameters chosen for the
creation of the groups are: radius rg = 7 and number of
groups ng = 35. These values ensure that more than 60%
of the loads in the system are included in one or more groups
and the ones that are outside of the groups have at least one
monitored neighboring load. Moreover, these load groups are
equally spread across the system; as a result, the system is
effectively monitored in its entirety. Preliminary testing has
shown that increasing the number of groups (and, thus, of the
loads considered) did not improve detection performance.
In each experiment, two datasets are needed: the normative
load data PN ∈ R1125×8784 and the anomalous load data
PA ∈ R1125×H , where H varies for the different type of
attacks. The normative data represents one load vector for each
hour of 2016 (2016 was a leap year). The set PA contains
attacked load vectors which are designed starting from the
normative load vectors in PN ; depending on the type of attack,
some of the loads are modified either intelligently or randomly,
as described below.
To compute detection probability and false alarm, the load
vectors of dataset PN are first divided into three subsets:
historical, training, and testing. The historical dataset P histN
includes 70% of the total hours of 2016 and it represents
the past loads known to the system operator and used in
its nearest neighbor algorithms. The training dataset P trainN
represents another 20% of PN and it is needed to determine
the thresholds τj for each load group. The remaining 10% of
normative load vectors is used as the testing dataset P testN to
determine the false alarm rate. To determine the threshold τj
for group gj , the minimum distance di,j between each load
vector pji for i in P
train
N and the historical dataset is computed
using (4). The threshold τj is defined as a fixed fraction of
the maximum closest distance, defined for each group as
dmax,j = max
pi∈P trainN
di,j . (5)
For each load vector in P testN , the minimum distance from
P histN is computed and compared with the threshold: the false
alarm rate is the ratio between the number of times a load
vector is labelled as attacked (e.g. at least one load group has
minimum distance greater than its corresponding threshold)
and the total number of load vectors in P testN . Similarly, the
minimum distance is calculated for every attacked case and
the detection probability is computed. As we will explain in
more detail in the next sections, varying the threshold about the
value dmax,j allows to span different detection probabilities and
false alarm rates in order to determine the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC). The proposed algorithm is extremely
efficient and testing a load vector only takes a fraction of a
second on a normal laptop; thus, even on large power systems,
5Fig. 3. Description of the 10-folding technique and definition of the
datasets
the detector can easily run in real-time.
Because the normative load dataset is limited to one year, in
order to have a more complete assessment of the performance
of the detector, a k-folding technique is used to test every
hour of the year by rotating through multiple sets of historical,
training, and testing datasets. The hours of 2016 are randomly
divided into ten equally sized partitions as illustrated in Fig. 3;
the partitions are fixed throughout the testing process. For
the first fold, the load vectors corresponding to the hours
in the first partition are assigned to P testN , the second and
third partitions to P trainN and the remaining seven represent
the historical data P histN . Given these partitions, the number of
false alarms and the number of attacks detected are calculated
on the normative and attacked load vectors in the testing
partition. The subsequent folds are created by shifting the
partitions assigned to the three datasets by one: for example,
in the second fold P testN will coincide with the second partition,
P trainN with the third and fourth partitions, and P
hist
N with
the remaining ones. The final detection probability is then
calculated by adding up the correctly identified attacks across
all folds and dividing by the total number of attacks; the false
alarm rate is the total number of false alarms divided by 8784.
B. Detection of intelligently designed attacks
We use the bi-level problem in [3] to design attacks that
simulate specific changes in loads to cause physical overflows
on a target line, while being unobservable to the system
operators (and SE). The testing procedure described in the
previous sections is employed here to verify the ability of the
proposed detector and grouping strategy in correctly identify-
ing malicious loads resulting from these intelligent attacks.
The bi-level problem in [3] is structured so that any one
branch can be selected as a target, and an attack will be
designed to maximize the flow on it. Depending on the specific
system conditions, a successful attack (that is, one causing
the resulting power flow to go above the branch rating) may
not exist; generally, the higher the pre-attack flow, the more
likely the attack will lead to overflow. For this reason, the first
step in designing the attacks is to run an AC optimal power
flow (ACOPF) for every load vector in PN to identify any
congested branch. For the purpose of this study, a congested
branch is any line or transformer that has a base case power
flow loading of 90% of its rating or more. Attacks are designed
Fig. 4. Intelligent attacks: detection probability as a function of load shift
and false alarm rate.
Fig. 5. Intelligent attacks: detection probability as a function of line
overload and false alarm rate.
on each hour of 2016 for which one or more branches are
congested. These branches are individually selected as targets
of the attacks; thus, an hour will have as many different attacks
as the number of branches with base case flow above 90%
in that hour. Moreover, for each target branch, attacks are
designed with a load shift factor ranging from 1% to 15%
in steps of 1%. This allows us to study how the detection
performance varies in relation to the attack magnitude. As a
result of this process, 8861 successful attacks are computed,
across every hour, target line, and load shifts.
The resulting attacked load vectors have been tested fol-
lowing the k-folding procedure in Section V-A, where the
threshold for each group gj was varied from 0.9 to 1.1 times
dmax,j . Figure 4 shows the detection probability (colored scale)
as a function of the load shift (x-axis) and the false alarm rate
(y-axis). It can be seen that the detector does not perform
well on attacks with very low load shifts, while for load
shift between 10 and 15% the detection probability goes from
80 to 100% with false alarm rates ranging from 0 to 3%.
While the load shift factor is an important metric in the
design phase of the attacks, from an operator’s perspective it is
more meaningful to evaluate the physical consequences of the
attacks. Figure 5 shows the detection probability as a function
of the line overload resulting from the attacks. From this
6Fig. 6. Random attacks: detection probability as a function of load shift
and footprint size for false alarm rate of 5.5% (top) and 0.4% (bottom).
figure we can easily see that the detector has extremely high
probability of detecting any attack that would cause important
physical damage: considering the safety margins built into the
operational tools, an overload of 2 or 3% is not likely to cause
any system disruption.
C. Detection of random load redistribution attacks
The experiments in the previous section have shown that the
proposed detector is very effective in identifying attacked load
vectors designed to create significant overflows on specific
target lines. In this section we study the sensitivity of this
algorithm to anomalous loads which have not necessarily been
intelligently designed. To do so, a large number of false load
vectors will be created starting from the historical data; the
detection performance is then computed as the number of
modified loads and the amount of load change are varied
across a broad spectrum.
The false load vectors are created by randomly selecting
a subset of the loads in each vector of PN and modifying
them by either increasing or decreasing their value by a given
load shift factor. For this study, the same load shifts as in
the previous section are used, while the footprint size of the
attack as a percentage of the total number of system loads
is varied between 10% and 100% in steps of 10% for every
hour. The resulting anomalous load dataset PA has dimensions
1125×H , where H = 8784×15×10 = 1, 317, 600. Similarly
to what done in the previous section, all these false load
Fig. 7. Random attacks: detection probability as a function of line
overload and false alarm rate.
vectors are fed to the proposed detector and the detection
probability computed. In this case, the detection probability
is a function of three parameters: the false alarm rate, the
load shift, and the footprint size. Figure 6 shows the detection
probability (colored scale) as a function of the footprint size
(x-axis) and the load shift (y-axis), when a high false alarm
rate of 5.5% is allowed (top) and for a very low false alarm
rate of 0.4% (bottom). Clearly, for a given load shift and
footprint size, the detection probability is higher when the
false alarm rate is higher. Overall, the detector performs
well, having perfect detection capability for a wide range of
different attacks. Compared to the detection performance on
intelligently designed attacks, the detector is not as good at
identifying the random attacks with small load shift and small
percentages of attacked loads. This can be explained by the
fact that the intelligent attacks are designed in such a way that
the modified loads belong to a spatially concentrated subgraph,
thus it is likely that some of the load groups will include a large
number of attacked loads. In the random attacks, the loads
are modified across the whole network and, hence, distributed
across a higher number of groups; because of this, each group
will experience a smaller deviation from the normative data,
resulting in worse detection capability. On the other hand,
because of this fact, the random attacks are less likely to cause
line overloads. Figure 7 shows the detection probability versus
line overload and false alarm rate. From these results it can be
seen that any random attack that would result in line overloads
is easily detected, demonstrating the high effectiveness of the
proposed algorithm in detecting anomalous and dangerous
load vectors.
D. Integration within EMS
The proposed detector has been fully implemented in a
state-of-the-art EMS platform developed at Arizona State Uni-
versity [18]. This software was created as part of NSF Grant
1449080, by an ASU team lead by Dr. Lalitha Sankar, Dr.
Kory Hedman, and Dr. Oliver Kosut and in collaboration with
Dr. Robin Podmore from IncSys, Inc., leader in power system
simulation tools and operator training [19], [20]. Figure 8
shows the interface of the platform: on the left is the network
graph of the Texas system, while, on the right, the simulation
7Fig. 8. Implementation of the improved bad data detector within an EMS
page with the main blocks of the EMS is displayed. In the
example shown, the traditional residue-based BDD has easily
been bypassed, while the proposed anomalous load detector
identifies the attack and gives information on the extent of
the attack based on the number of groups that raised a flag.
Overall, this platform allows for the testing of the detector in
a realistic power system operations environment while show-
casing its effectiveness in terms of computational efficiency
and integration within energy managements systems. Details
on the design of the software platform and its building blocks
can be found in [21], while the code for the attack detection
algorithm is freely available on Github [22].
VI. ATTACK LOCALIZATION
In the previous sections, we have introduced a load anomaly
detector based on nearest neighbor and a grouping strategy
which was shown to have excellent performance against
both intelligently designed attacks and random load changes.
This algorithm can be extended beyond simply determining
whether a load vector contains anomalous data or not; it can
be leveraged to determine which buses have been modified
or are deviating from their usual behavior. Localizing the
subgraph affected by an attack or load anomaly represents a
step forward in terms of system operations security. Knowing
which loads are likely to have caused the detector to raise an
alarm is an important step in the implementation of secure
EMS functionalities. For example, the load values which are
determined to be unreliable could be replaced by forecasted
values or an uncertainty margin assigned to them so that the
system could be operated in a secure state.
A similar approach for secure operations against cyber-
attacks is studied in [23], where the authors present an optimal
dispatch problem to find a secure and cost-effective dispatch
solution considering variable bus loads and, thus, protecting
the system from unexpected load changes. Also, in [24], a
secure unit commitment (UC) problem is formulated such
that in case of a cyber attack the system operator can switch
from the normal UC solution to a secure one while following
all network constraints. The issue with these approaches is
that it would cause the system to be operated in a too
conservative and, thus, less efficient state for most of the time.
The advantage of being able to detect and localize an attack is
that the system operator can make a better informed decision
on when and how to secure the system, without impacting
normal operations.
A. Likelihood determination
The grouping strategy provides an approximate way of
localizing the attacks by identifying groups of loads that
deviate from their normative behavior. In this section, we
describe a statistical approach to further analyze the values
of the individual loads to identify which ones are more likely
to have triggered the detector. Because of the many attack
subgraphs that are possible, determining exactly which are the
attacked loads would be extremely hard. For this reason, our
goal is to assign to each load a probability ql that represents
the likelihood of that load being attacked. In this sense, the
likelihood is a risk measure and it can be quantified using an
empirical metric that relies on estimated likelihoods, namely
average log-loss (also known as cross-entropy) [25]. Average
log-loss is defined as
l =
1
nL
nL∑
l=1
−[yllog2(ql) + (1− yl)log2(1− ql)] (6)
where nL represents the total number of samples (e.g. loads
tested), ql is the probability associated with each load, and
yl is 1 if the load was indeed attacked and 0 if it was not
modified.
8We define the values of the loads in group j at time i as
pji = [p
j
i,1, p
j
i,2, . . . , p
j
i,kj
]T , where kj is the number of loads in
group j. The minimum distance di,j between the load vector
pji and the historical data is computed using (4); as explained
in Section IV-B, if di,j is greater than threshold τj , group j is
said to raise a violation at time i. Moreover, define the loads
in the nearest neighbor of pji as h
j
r = [h
j
r,1, h
j
r,2, . . . , h
j
r,kj
]T ,
where hr is the rth historical load vector in P histN . For each
load in group j, the normalized difference between load l at
time i and its corresponding value in the nearest neighbor hjr
is computed as
δji,l =
∣∣∣∣∣p
j
i,l − hjr,l
hjr,l
∣∣∣∣∣ l = 1, . . . , kj . (7)
We cannot directly look at this normalized difference to
know if a load is attacked because different loads could
have different amounts of deviation. In order to account for
this variability, we determine the normative behavior of each
load by computing the first and second order statistics of its
normalized difference:
µδjl
=
1
ni
∑
i∈P trainN
δji,l ∀l,∀j (8)
σδjl
=
√√√√ 1
ni
∑
i∈P trainN
(δji,l − µδjl )2 ∀l,∀j. (9)
Given a specific load vector pi ∈ P testN and its corresponding
δji,l for all l and j, we determine how far each load deviates
from the normative behavior using a Z-score which is defined
as follows:
zji,l =
δji,l − µδjl
σδjl
. (10)
Intuitively, the Z-score indicates the number of standard devi-
ations by which δji,l is above (or below) the mean for load l
in group j observed in the attack-free data.
Based on this setup, there exists a joint distribution
Q(a, v, z) between whether a load was attacked (a = 1) or
not (a = 0), if it belongs to a group that raised a violation
(v = 1) or not (v = 0), and its Z-score z. While Q(a, v, z)
is not known, we can empirically estimate the conditional
probability Q(a|v, z) of a load being attacked given its Z-
score and whether it raised a violation or not. In other words,
our goal is to define a likelihood function L(v, z) that takes
as inputs a load’s Z-score and whether it raised a violation to
determine the probability that the load is attacked.
First, we compute the Z-score (10) for all intelligently
designed attacks in PA that result in an overload of 3% or
more. As discussed in Section V-B, those are the attacks
that can cause significant damage and they are almost always
detected by the nearest neighbor algorithm. The histogram of
the Z-score for the loads that belonged to groups that raised
a violation is shown in Fig. 9. In particular, the solid black
line represents the histogram of Z-scores for loads that were
attacked and we indicate as φa=1,v=1(z), while the black
dotted line represents the histogram for loads that were not
attacked φa=0,v=1(z). From these two curves, we notice that
Fig. 9. Distribution of Z-scores (in black) and likelihood function (in red)
for loads in groups that raise a violation.
Fig. 10. Distribution of Z-scores (in black) and likelihood function (in
red) for loads in groups that do not raise a violation.
overall if a load belongs to a group that raised a violation it is
very likely that the load is indeed being attacked. Moreover,
the higher the Z-score, the more likely it is that a load is
attacked. Based on these observations we can now define a
function that maps the Z-score of a load to the likelihood of
the load being attacked. The estimated conditional likelihood
for loads that are in groups that raise a violation is computed
as
L¯a|v=1,Z=z = φa=1,v=1(z)
φa=1,v=1(z) + φa=0,v=1(z)
(11)
and it is shown by the solid red line in Fig. 9. For the set
of data points we obtain using (11), we fitted a smooth curve
of the form a · e−b·x + c to avoid overfitting as shown by
the dotted red line. This curve is defined as the conditional
likelihood Lˆa|v=1,Z=z which can be used to assign to each
load a probability of being attacked based on its Z-score. The
same procedure is performed on the loads in groups that do not
raise a violation and the corresponding likelihood Lˆa|v=0,Z=z
is estimated; the results are shown in Fig. 10. Comparing the
two conditional likelihood functions we notice that, for low Z-
score values, Lˆa|v=1,Z=z reaches a minimum likelihood value
of around 0.5 while Lˆa|v=0,Z=z reaches zero.
9B. Numerical results
The performance of this approach is tested on the in-
telligently designed attacks from Section V-B, with τj =
dmax,j . The conditional likelihood functions Lˆa|v=1,Z=z and
Lˆa|v=0,Z=z are learned on 70% of the attacks and they are
tested on the remaining 30%. The Z-score for every load is
computed using (10) and the average log-loss as in (6).
As a way of comparison, we also tested two simpler
approaches to assign likelihood values to each load. The first
one does not rely on the Z-score and only considers if the load
belongs to groups with violations or not: based on our data,
on average, in a group that raised a violation 82% of the loads
are attacked, while in groups that did not raise violations only
10% are actually attacked. Based on this prior knowledge, the
first simple approach assigns a likelihood ql = 0.82 if load l is
in a group with violations and ql = 0.10 otherwise. The second
approach is even simpler and it assigns a fixed likelihood to
every load regardless of which group they belong to; from our
results, the optimal value for this approach is ql = 0.15. The
results of the Z-score-based approach (indicated as q(a|v, z)),
as well as the two simpler ones (indicated as q(a|v) and
q(a)) are summarized in Table I. We can see that the more
sophisticated the approach (i.e. the more information is used),
the smaller the average log-loss.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF THE THREE LIKELIHOOD
APPROACHES.
Approach q(a|v, z) q(a|v) q(a)
Average log-loss 0.340 0.489 0.608
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented an improved data-driven al-
gorithm for the detection of load redistribution attacks and
a statistical approach for the localization of the attacked
buses. The detector, based on nearest neighbor and a grouping
strategy, was tested on a large number of attacks belonging
to two different classes: intelligent attacks and random load
changing attacks. The results obtained on the synthetic Texas
system show excellent detection capability, especially against
the attacks that have the worst consequences on the system.
The attack localization scheme assigns a likelihood value to
each load indicating the probability of that load being attacked;
this approach offers operators a greater insight in case of
cyber-attacks allowing for more secure system operation.
As part of our future work, we intend to extend the detection
algorithm to the analysis of different anomalies; the model can
be trained to not only detect an anomaly, but also determine
the type of event that caused it (cyber-attack, natural event,
fault, etc.). Moreover, the algorithm can be enhanced by
taking into consideration additional information about rare and
sporadic events, such as forecasts of extreme weather events
or temporary changes in load patterns due to known causes
(e.g. sporting events, holidays, etc.). This could result in both
improved detection probability and lower false alarm rate.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against
state estimation in electric power grids,” Ccs, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1–33,
2009.
[2] Y. Yuan, Z. Li, and K. Ren, “Modeling Load Redistribution Attacks in
Power Systems,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2011.
[3] J. Zhang and L. Sankar, “Physical system consequences of unobservable
state-and-topology cyber-physical attacks,” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 2016–2025, 2016.
[4] A. Sanjab and W. Saad, “Data Injection Attacks on Smart Grids With
Multiple Adversaries: A Game-Theoretic Perspective,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 2038–2049, jul 2016.
[5] L. Xie, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “Integrity Data Attacks in Power Market
Operations,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 659–
666, dec 2011.
[6] A. Pinceti, L. Sankar, and O. Kosut, “Load Redistribution Attack
Detection using Machine Learning: A Data-Driven Approach,” in IEEE
Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2018.
[7] V. Joshi, J. Solanki, and S. K. Solanki, “Statistical methods for detection
and mitigation of the effect of different types of cyber-attacks and
parameter inconsistencies in a real world distribution system,” in 2017
North American Power Symposium, NAPS 2017, 2017.
[8] J. J. Yu, Y. Hou, and V. O. Li, “Online False Data Injection Attack
Detection with Wavelet Transform and Deep Neural Networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2018.
[9] Y. Huang, J. Tang, Y. Cheng, H. Li, K. A. Campbell, and Z. Han, “Real-
time detection of false data injection in smart grid networks: An adaptive
CUSUM method and analysis,” IEEE Systems Journal, 2016.
[10] Z. Chu, J. Zhang, O. Kosut, and L. Sankar, “Evaluating power system
vulnerability to false data injection attacks via scalable optimization,”
Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2016 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference, Nov. 2016.
[11] T. Cover and P. Hart, “Nearest neighbor pattern classification,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 13, no. 1, January 1967.
[12] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar, “Anomaly detection : A
survey,” ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 41(3), no. 15, July 2009.
[13] PJM, “PJM metered load data.” [Online]. Available: https://dataminer2.
pjm.com/feed/hrlloadmetered/definition.
[14] A. B. Birchfield, T. Xu, K. M. Gegner, K. S. Shetye, and T. J. Overbye,
“Grid Structural Characteristics as Validation Criteria for Synthetic
Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 32, no. 4, pp.
3258–3265, Jul 2017.
[15] H. Li, A. L. Bornsheuer, T. Xu, A. B. Birchfield, and T. J. Overbye,
“Load modeling in synthetic electric grids,” in 2018 IEEE Texas Power
and Energy Conference, TPEC 2018, 2018.
[16] R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Snchez, and R. J. Thomas, “Matpower:
Steady-state operations, planning, and analysis tools for power systems
research and education,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 26,
no. 1, pp. 12–19, Feb 2011.
[17] A. Pinceti, L. Sankar, and O. Kosut, “Data-Driven Generation of
Synthetic Load Datasets Preserving Spatio-Temporal Features,” in IEEE
Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2019.
[18] L. Sankar, O. Kosut, and K. Hedman, “A verifiable framework for
cyber-physical attacks and countermeasures in a resilient electric
power grid.” [Online]. Available: https://sankar.engineering.asu.edu/
nfs-dhs-cps-framework/
[19] R. Podmore, “Digital computer analysis of power system networks,”
PhD Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1972.
[20] IncSys, Inc., “IncSys - power system simulation software.” [Online].
Available: www.incsys.com
[21] R. Khodadadeh, “Designing a software platform for evaluating cyber-
attacks on the electric power grid,” Master’s Thesis, 2019. [Online].
Available: http://search.proquest.com/docview/2228212793/
[22] A. Pinceti, “Nearest neighbor attack detection,” https://github.com/
apince/EMS FDI NearestNeighborAttackDetection, 2019.
[23] A. Abusorrah, A. Alabdulwahab, Z. Li, and M. Shahidehpour,
“Minimax-Regret Robust Defensive Strategy Against False Data Injec-
tion Attacks,” 2017.
[24] H. Shayan and T. Amraee, “Network Constrained Unit Commitment
Under Cyber Attacks Driven Overloads,” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, p. 1, 2019.
[25] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory. Wiley-
Interscience, 1991, ch. 13.
